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of an insurance game. Our setting allows multiple insurers with translation invariant
preferences. We characterise the Pareto optimal contracts, which determines the shape
of the indemnities. Closed-form and numerical solutions are found for various preferences
that the insurance players might have. Determining associated premiums with any given
optimal Pareto contract is another problem for which economic-based arguments are
further discussed. We also explain how one may link the recent fast growing literature
on risk-based optimality criteria to the Pareto optimality criterion and we show that
the latter is much more general than the former one, which according to our knowledge,
has not been pointed out by now. Further, we extend some of our results when model
risk is included, i.e. there is some uncertainty with the risk model and/or the insurance
players make decisions based on divergent beliefs about the underlying risk. These
robust optimal contracts are investigated and we show how one may find robust and
Pareto efficient contracts, which is a key decision-making problem under uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the optimal insurance contract design, where contracts following from bargaining
amongst multiple insurers. A policyholder (PH) seeks to insure a part of its risk in a market where
multiple insurers are present. We assume that insurance contracts are Pareto optimal, implying
that there is no alternative contract that is better for all parties and strictly better for at least one
party. Moreover, the aggregate premium that the PH pays is shared amongst the insurers. We
propose a cooperative game to determine a set of stable allocations that leads to a set of premiums.
This set of stable allocations is obtained via the core of an appropriate cooperative game. The core
is originally introduced for general cooperative games by Gillies (1953) and Scarf (1967).
Whereas most of the traditional literature on insurance contract design focuses on optimal
contracts with given premium functions (Borch, 1960; Arrow, 1963), we assume that indemnities
and premiums follow from bargaining amongst the insurers. This approach is in line with Raviv
(1979), who focuses on Pareto optimal insurance contracts with expected utilities.1 We assume that
all agents are endowed with a specific class of translation invariant risk measures, of which dual
utility (Yaari, 1987) is a canonical example. Maximising dual utility is equivalent to minimising
a distortion risk measure, as introduced by Wang et al. (1997). Dual utilities are often used to
represent the preferences of corporations as regulatory requirements are based on a distortion risk
measure in the Swiss Solvency Test regulation for insurers (a conditional Value-at-Risk), and a
popular insurance premium principle is the distortion premium principle (Wang, 1996).
In contrast to Raviv (1979) that imposes an expected value principle bound on the premiums,
our approach proposes a two-stage process that separates the indemnities and premiums via Pareto
optimality: Pareto optimality yields a particular shape of the indemnities, but not on the premi-
ums. We are allowed to do this when the preferences are translation invariant, whereas Raviv (1979)
focusses on expected utilities. We use a game-theoretic approach to determine a set of premiums.
Game-theoretic approaches to optimal reinsurance contract design are not new in case of expected
utility preferences. In particular, Baton and Lemaire (1981) investigate the core in reinsurance mar-
kets. Moreover, Suijs et al. (1998, 1999) study the core of insurance markets under the restriction
that insurance contracts are proportional.
In this paper, we focus on risk sharing of insurance contracts, where there are multiple insurers
1Borch (1962) and DuMouchel (1968) study Pareto optimal risk sharing in a reinsurance markets. In reinsurance
markets, the only constraint on risk sharing contracts is that all risk is redistributed. There do not appear constraints
such as the non-negativity of premiums and the constraint is that the insurance coverage cannot be larger than the
underlying loss.
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that are willing to sell insurance to a PH. In insurance, there are constraints on indemnities that are
used for a convex optimisation problem to determine Pareto optimal contracts. We allow for a very
general class of insurance indemnities. We show that Pareto optimality provides us with a structure
on the indemnity contracts, but not on the corresponding prices. For a Pareto optimal contracts,
we study the core and anti-core of an appropriate cooperative game to select a range of premiums.
The insurance contracts must be such that no subgroup of insurers has a joint incentive to stay
in the market, while paying the other insurers their maximum joint welfare gain. The maximum
joint welfare gain represents the maximum aggregate profit of this subgroup of insurers in a market
without the other insurers. We show that this stability criterion leads us to allocations in the anti-
core of a cooperative game. We show that the anti-core is non-empty and provide a closed-form
expression in case the agents are endowed with dual utilities.
When the objectives are given by risk measures, Pareto optimality is also studied by Boonen et
al. (2016a) and Cai et al. (2017). Boonen et al. (2016a) discard the non-negativity property
of prices. Such constraints change the underlying method to solve Pareto optimal contracts, but
we show that the outcomes are similar. Cai et al. (2017) focus on Pareto optimality of insurance
arrangements, but with given premium functionals. The approach with given premium functionals
has been popular in the related literature of optimal reinsurance contract design. These kind
of assumptions facilitate obtaining explicit solutions of such optimal contracts, but it could be
criticised for their ad-hoc mathematical representation. On the contrary, our approach aims to let
the premium be part of the insurance contract to bargain for rather than imposing a rigid premium
setting. We show that optimal reinsurance contracts are Pareto optimal, where optimal reinsurance
contracts are obtained by optimising the preferences of one party under participation constraints
of the other parties. There is a fast growing literature on optimal reinsurance contract design (see,
e.g., Young, 1999; Balba´s et al., 2011; Chi, 2012; Asimit et al., 2013; Cui et al., 2013; Bernard et al.,
2015). We are the first to make a connection between Pareto optimality and optimal reinsurance
contract design.
The uncertainty with choosing the right model, also known as model risk, is an important issue
and cannot be ignored. The common practical issue is data scarcity, which represents a standard
source for model error. Expert opinion is quite often another way of choosing a model believed to be
the “best” possible one, which is limited to the past experience and individual perspectives about
future outcomes. Another source of model error is given by proxy models, models that are socially
accepted within a profession and widely spread in regulation standards. The underlying model is
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not unknowable, but unknown and the decision-maker is exposed to a higher level of uncertainty
and robust decisions are desirable. Encapsulating the model error in the decision-making process
may not be done in the same fashion amongst all decision-makers. That is, there might be divergent
beliefs about the concurrent risk models that various decision-makers validate as plausible models.
The classical theory of robust statistics (for example, see Huber, 1964; Huber and Ronchetti, 2009)
helps the decision-maker to produce a robust model choice and this is usually possible if data scarcity
is not present. Another disadvantage of this method when solving an optimisation problem is that
the ultimate goal is to identify a robust optimal decision and not necessary a robust model choice.
This is precisely why the robust optimisation becomes a standard method to resolve the issue of
optimisation under uncertainty. Within the optimal insurance problem, some attempts appeared
recently in Balba´s et al. (2015) and Asimit et al. (2017a). Wilson (1968), Acciaio and Svindland
(2009), Boonen (2016), and Ghossoub (2017) all study risk sharing where agents have heterogeneous
beliefs, i.e. the model risk is refuted by all insurance players and there is one “true” and known
model for each player.
This paper is set out as follows: Section 2 states the model set-up; Section 3 characterises the
Pareto optimality set, while closed-form and numerical solutions are discussed in Section 4; Section 5
characterises a class of premiums using cooperative game theory for two classes of preferences; the
link between the more recent literature on individual optimal insurance and the classical Pareto
optimal concept is revealed in Section 6; Section 7 generalises our results to the case in which the
model risk is no longer ignored; finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Model Set-up
Consider a probability space given by (Ω,F ,P) and then, for any 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, let Lp(P) be the set of
p-integrable random variables. Moreover, Lp+(P) is the set of non-negative and p-integrable random
variables. The standard insurance usually assumes that there is one PH who wishes to insure its
risk X ∈ Lp+(P) (a loss) on a given future reference period and let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of
available insurers that are willing to cover a part or possibly the entire risk. It is further assumed
that the PH and each insurer have preferences ordered via risk measures on Lp(P), denoted by ρPH
and ρi, i ∈ N , respectively. That is, the functionals ρPH , ρi : Lp(P) → R are considered, where
i ∈ N . Various risk measure properties appeared in the literature and the following are recalled in
this paper for a generic risk measure ρ : Lp(P)→ R:
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(P1) Monotonicity : If Y ≤ Z P-almost surely, then ρ(Y ) ≤ ρ(Z);
(P2) Translation Invariance: For any m ∈ R, ρ(Y +m) = ρ(Y ) +m;
(P3) Positive homogeneity : For any λ ≥ 0, ρ(λY ) = λρ(Y );
(P4) Subadditivity : ρ(Y + Z) ≤ ρ(Y ) + ρ(Z);
(P5) Convexity : For any 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, ρ(βY + (1− β)Z) ≤ βρ(Y ) + (1− β)ρ(Z);
(P6) Strict convexity : For any 0 < β < 1, ρ
(
βY + (1− β)Z) < βρ(Y ) + (1− β)ρ(Z) provided that
there exists no a ∈ R such that Y − Z = a P-almost surely;
(P7) Comonotonic additivity : If Y and Z are comonotonic, i.e.
(
Y (ω)−Y (ω′))(Z(ω)−Z(ω′)) ≥ 0
for any ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, then ρ(Y + Z) = ρ(Y ) + ρ(Z).
Throughout this paper, all risk measures are law-invariant2 and satisfy (P2). Moreover, without
loss of generality, we assume ρ(0) = 0. Recall that a risk measure that satisfies (P1)–(P4) is
a coherent risk measure. Moreover, a distortion risk measure satisfies (P1), (P7), law-invariance
and a continuity-type property (for details, see Wang et al., 1997); these risk measures have been
introduced in the insurance pricing context by Wang (1996), even though it appears earlier as a pref-
erence relation known as dual utility (see Yaari, 1987). Specifically, the mathematical formulation
of a distortion risk measure is given by
ρ(Y ) =
∞∫
0
g
(
SY (z)
)
dz −
0∫
−∞
[
1− g(SY (z))] dz, (2.1)
for all Y ∈ Lp(P), where SY (·) = P(Y > ·) and g : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a non-decreasing function with
g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1 known as distortion function. Note that the integrals in (2.1) are assumed
to be finite and distortion risk measures also satisfy (P2) and (P3). Distortion risk measures are
characterised by Yaari (1987) as an alternative to expected utility. For distortion risk measures, the
evaluation of a risk is linear in the pay-offs, but non-linear in the probabilities.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the PH seeks to share its risk X ∈ Lp+(P) with some
insurers. The set of insurers that the PH is trading with is given by the set S ⊆ N . Each insurer
accepts to cover Xi ∈ Lp+(P) such that Xi ≤ X in exchange of a premium pii ≥ 0, where i ∈ S and
as a result, the PH covers the remaining amount XPH = X −
∑
i∈S Xi and pays the total premium∑
i∈S pii.
2By definition, ρ is law-invariant if for any Y,Z ∈ Lp(P) with Y d= Z, then ρ(Y ) = ρ(Z).
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Next, we explain the set of feasible insurance contracts, that include rationality constraints for
all insurance agents. Each insurer aims to minimise its own risk, ρi
(
Xi − pii
)
, under the rationality
constraint ρi
(
Xi − pii
) ≤ 0, where ρi(0) = 0 is the risk of insurer i before the transaction. Simi-
larly, the PH aims to reduce its risk, ρPH
(
XPH +
∑
i∈S pii
)
, under its own rationality constraint
ρPH
(
XPH +
∑
i∈S pii
)
≤ ρPH(X), where ρPH(X) is the risk of the PH before the transfer is made.
Therefore, we call a contract
(
piS , XS
)
feasible if
ρi
(
Xi − pii
) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S and ρPH(XPH +∑
i∈S
pii
)
≤ ρPH(X). (2.2)
We write
(
piS , XS
) ∈ RS+ ×AS(X), where
AS(X) =
{
XS :
∑
i∈S∪PH
Xi = X, Xi ∈ Lp+(P) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH
}
.
Moreover, the risk profiles XS ∈ AS(X) are called risk allocations.
The main purpose of the paper is to characterise the optimal insurance contract amongst all
insurance players. The most common approach in the economic theory is the Pareto criterion, which
is detailed in the next section.
3 Characterisation of Pareto optimal contracts
It is an irrefutable fact that conflicting objectives arise amongst insurer players and therefore,
a compromising mutually beneficiary solution is of interest, which is usually attained via Pareto
optimality. By definition, for a given S ⊆ N , the contract (piS , XS) ∈ RS+×AS(X) is called Pareto
optimal if it is feasible and there is no other feasible contract
(
p˜iS , X˜
S) ∈ RS+ ×AS(X) such that
ρi
(
X˜i − p˜ii
) ≤ ρi(Xi − pii) for all i ∈ S and ρPH(X˜PH +∑
i∈S
p˜ii
) ≤ ρPH(XPH +∑
i∈S
pii
)
,
with at least one strict inequality. Let us denote PS as the set of all Pareto optimal contracts. The
next theorem characterises the set of Pareto optimal contracts and is given as Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. If ρi satisfies (P2) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH, then PS = SS , where
SS = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xi) s.t. condition (2.2) holds. (3.1)
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Proof. We first show by contradiction that SS ⊆ PS . Thus, there exists a contract
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) ∈ SS
that is not Pareto optimal. This means that there exists
(
p˜iS , X˜
S) ∈ RS+ ×AS(X) such that
ρi
(
X˜i − p˜ii
) ≤ ρi(X∗i − pi∗i ), for all i ∈ S and ρPH
(
X˜PH +
∑
i∈S
p˜ii
)
≤ ρPH
(
X∗PH +
∑
i∈S
pi∗i
)
with at least one strict inequality. Thus, since all risk preferences satisfy (P2),
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
X˜i
)
<
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
X∗i
)
, (3.2)
which contradicts that
(
pi∗S , X∗S
)
solves (3.1).
Let us prove now PS ⊆ SS , once again, by contradiction. Thus, there exists a Pareto optimal
contract
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) ∈ PS that is not a solution of (3.1). This means that there exists (p˜iS , X˜S) ∈
RS+ ×AS(X) such that (3.2) holds. For the sake of exposition, denote now
ai
(
piS , XS
)
= ρi
(
Xi − pii
)
for all i ∈ S and aPH
(
piS , XS
)
= ρPH
(
XPH +
∑
i∈S
pii
)
.
Let pˆiS = p˜iS + εS with εi = ai
(
p˜iS , X˜
S)− ai(pi∗S , X∗S) for all i ∈ S. Thus,
aPH
(
pˆiS , X˜
S)
= aPH
(
p˜iS , X˜
S)
+
∑
i∈S
εi < aPH
(
pi∗S , X∗S
)
, (3.3)
which is true due to (3.2). Further, for all i ∈ N , we have that
ai
(
pˆiS , X˜
S)
= ai
(
p˜iS , X˜
S)− εi = ai(pi∗S , X∗S). (3.4)
It is not difficult to verify that
(
pˆiS , X˜
S)
is a feasible contract, i.e.
ai
(
pˆiS , X˜
S) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S and aPH(pˆiS , X˜S) ≤ ρPH(XPH),
which are straightforward implications of relations (3.3), (3.4) and the rationality constraints for(
pi∗S , X∗S
)
. Note also that pˆii ≥ 0, since ai
(
pˆiS , X˜
S) ≤ 0 is true for all i ∈ S. Finally, the feasibility
of
(
pˆiS , X˜
S)
together with equations (3.3) and (3.4) imply that
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) 6∈ PS , which concludes
the proof of PS ⊆ SS . Hence, PS = SS , and so the proof is now complete.
Theorem 3.1 implies that if the minimum in (3.1) does not exist, the Pareto optimal set is empty.
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Recall that the rationality constraints imply that the PH does not pay any premium if the decision
is to not transfer anything to the insurers. According to Theorem 3.1, (P2) yields to a particular
structure on risk allocations if we focus on Pareto optimality, while the premiums may arbitrarily
be chosen as long as they yield a feasible contract. For expected utilities that do not satisfy (P2),
we are not always able to disentangle the risk allocations and the premiums in this way via Pareto
optimality (see Raviv, 1979).
Theorem 3.1 still holds if the rationality constraints from (2.2) are replaced by more stringent
transferability conditions such
ρi
(
Xi − pii
) ≤Mi for all i ∈ S and ρPH(XPH +∑
i∈S
pii
) ≤ ρPH(X), (3.5)
where Mi ≤ 0, i ∈ S. Therefore, the Pareto optimal set can be found by simply solving
min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
)
s.t. condition (3.5) holds.
Note that the premiums piS are not present in the above objective function, while the constraints
are linear in the pii’s. Thus, the latter optimisation problem is equivalent to solving
min
XS∈AS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
)
s.t.
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
) ≤∑
i∈S
Mi + ρPH(X), (3.6)
where the premiums belong to a set that depends on the optimal solution XS . Interestingly, the
standard set (when Mi = 0 for all i ∈ S) of Pareto contracts becomes much simpler and it is
equivalent to solving
min
XS∈AS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xi). (3.7)
Note 3.2. Since the objective function appears as a constraint as well in (3.6), then solving (3.6)
is the same as solving the unconstrained counterpart, i.e. (3.7), but one should check if the optimal
objective value of (3.7) satisfies the inequality constraint; otherwise the set of feasible solutions of
(3.6) is an empty set.
An usual assumption in risk transferring is to assume comonotonic risk allocations. More specif-
ically, if we do not impose the retained risk XPH by the PH to be non-decreasing in the total risk,
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then the PH would have an incentive to under-report their losses. On the other hand, if XPH
increases more rapidly than X, then the PH would have an incentive to create incremental losses.
Similar arguments could be found if the insurance coverage Xi would not be non-decreasing in the
total loss. This implies that we replace the feasible set AS(X) in (3.7) by the following smaller set:
CS(X) =
{
XS ∈ AS(X) : Xi, Xj are comonotonic for all i, j ∈ S ∪ PH
}
.
Note that risk allocations in AS(X)\CS(X) may be decreasing in the loss or have discontinuities and
cut-off points, where the indemnity drops to zero after a certain loss level.3 Recall that the insurance
focused literature discusses many specific insurance contracts that are not elements of CS(X); for
example, marine breakdown insurance may expect a different risk behaviour, since the risk manager
is not the direct beneficiary of the insurance contract. Despite these examples, the vast majority
of the existing insurance contracts are elements of CS . A reasonable trade-off between practicality
and generality would be to choose CS as the actual feasible set. The following proposition shows
that Pareto optimal contracts could then still be found.
Proposition 3.3. If ρi satisfy (P5) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH, then (3.6) is solved by any solution of
min
XS∈CS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
)
s.t.
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
) ≤∑
i∈S
Mi + ρPH(X). (3.8)
Moreover, if (3.6) has no solution, then (3.8) has no solution either.
Proof. Firstly, assume that (3.8) is solved by X∗S ∈ CS(X) and this solution does not solve (3.6).
Thus, X∗S is feasible for (3.6) and in turn, there exists a feasible solution of (3.6), Xˆ
S ∈ AS(X),
such that ∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xˆi
)
<
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
X∗i
)
.
Theorem 2.3 of Burgert and Ru¨schendorf (2006) shows that for law-invariant (as we implicitly
assumed from the very beginning) preferences satisfying (P5), there exists X˜
S ∈ CS(X) such that
ρi
(
X˜i
) ≤ ρi(Xˆi) for all i ∈ S∪PH. Recall that XˆS is feasible for (3.6) and therefore, X˜S is feasible
for (3.8) and improves its objective since
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
X˜i
) ≤ ∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xˆi
)
<
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
X˜∗i
) ≤∑
i∈S
Mi + ρPH(X),
3Such risk allocation is found in Bernard et al. (2015).
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which contradicts our assumption that X∗S does not solve (3.6).
Secondly, assume that (3.6) has no solution, but (3.8) is solved by X∗S ∈ CS(X). Thus, X∗S is
feasible for (3.6) and in turn, there exists a feasible solution to (3.6), Xˆ
S ∈ AS(X), such that
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xˆi
)
<
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
X∗i
)
.
Once again, Theorem 2.3 of Burgert and Ru¨schendorf (2006) tells us that there exists X˜
S ∈ CS(X)
such that ρi
(
X˜i
) ≤ ρi(Xˆi) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH. It is not difficult to find that X˜S is feasible for
(3.8) and improves its objective, which contradicts our assumption. Hence, (3.8) has no solution
whenever (3.6) has no solution. This concludes the proof.
The convexity is a crucial assumption in Proposition 3.3 and counterexamples are possible
(for example, see Theorem 4.3 from Embrechts et al., 2016); for numerical purposes, there is an
advantage to know if the Pareto optimal contracts are comonotonic. The next theorem shows that
all Pareto optimal contracts are comonotonic under some certain conditions.
Theorem 3.4. If ρi satisfy (P2) for all i ∈ S ∪PH, then every solution XS to (3.7) is comonotonic
if one of the following properties holds:
i) ρi satisfy (P6) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH;
ii) ρi is a distortion risk measure with strictly concave distortion functions for all i ∈ S ∪PH; in
addition, X ∈ L∞+ (P) and (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic.4
Proof. Instead of (3.7), consider now the following auxiliary problem:
min
Y S∈AS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Yi
)
, AS(X) =
{
Y S :
∑
i∈S∪PH
Yi=X, Yi ∈ Lp
(
P
)
, i∈S∪PH
}
. (3.9)
Thus, we solve (3.7) for risks that are not necessarily non-negative. Then, if we find a solution of
(3.9) that is feasible for the problem (3.7), then it solves (3.7) as well. Note that for the sake of
simplicity, the superscript S is removed in the remaining part of the proof.
Part i) is first shown. Proposition 3.1 of Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008) shows that there exists
a unique allocation for (3.9) up to rebalancing the cash. In other words, if Y 1 and Y 2 solve (3.9)
then Y 1−Y 2 is a deterministic vector. Let
(
hi(X), i ∈ S∪PH
)
be a solution of (3.9). Theorem 2.3
4By definition, L∞+ (P) is the set of non-negative and bounded random variables, and a probability space (Ω,F ,P)
is non-atomic if there is no A ∈ F such that for every B ∈ F with P(B) < P(A) we have P(B) = 0.
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of Burgert and Ru¨schendorf (2006) implies that
(
hi(X), i ∈ S ∪ PH
)
is comonotonic, implying the
functions hi to be non-decreasing. Thus, hi(X) + ci := hi(X)−hi(0), i ∈ S ∪PH solves (3.9), since
all risk measures satisfy (P2), Moreover, hi(X) + ci, i ∈ S ∪ PH is feasible to (3.8) and hence, it
solves (3.8) as well. This concludes Part (i).
Consider now Part ii) and let Y be a non-comonotonic risk allocation. Theorem 3.1 of Carlier et
al. (2012) says that there exists an allocation that strictly dominates in convex order Y . Thus,
there exists Yˆ such that E
(
φ(Y )
)
> E
(
φ(Yˆ )
)
for every strictly convex φ and E
(
φˆ(Y )
) ≥ E(φˆ(Yˆ ))
for every convex φˆ (for details, see Lemma 2.2 of Carlier et al., 2012).
Strict concavity of a probability distortion function implies that ρi for all i ∈ S ∪ PH strictly
preserve second order stochastic dominance (see Corollary 2 of Chew et al., 1987) and in turn,
ρi
(
Yi
)
> ρi
(
Yˆi
)
for all i ∈ S ∪ PH. Hence, if Y is not comonotonic, then there exist Yˆ such that
ρi
(
Yi
)
> ρi
(
Yˆi
)
, i ∈ S ∪ PH, implying that Y does not solve (3.9). Let (hi(X), i ∈ S ∪ PH) be
a comonotonic solution of (3.9). Note that hi(X) + ci := hi(X) − hi(0) solves (3.9) due to (P2),
which clearly solves (3.7) as well. Thus, Y does not solve (3.7) and hence, all solutions to (3.7) are
comonotonic, concluding the proof of Part (ii). The proof is now complete.
Theorem 3.4 provides us two conditions under which we know that Pareto optimal contracts are
comonotonic under some fairly general conditions. Moreover, for finding Pareto optimal contracts,
Theorem 3.4 helps us to justify a focus only on comonotonic contracts if one of the two conditions
is satisfied. Finding Pareto optimal contracts is the topic of Section 4.
4 Finding the Pareto optimal contracts
We have shown in Section 3 that under some mild conditions, the Pareto contract set coincides with
solving (3.7). This enables us to establish the optimal risk allocation, which is the main purpose
of this section. Solving (3.7) is now investigated and sometimes, closed-form optimal solutions are
possible in some particular settings, otherwise, numerical solutions are sought. In a nutshell, if (3.7)
is solved in CS and all risk measures are distortion risk measures or all risk measures are exponential
utilities, then elegant closed-form optimal solutions are possible, as stated in Propositions 4.1 and
4.2. All other cases could be numerically solved and two examples are later provided for which
efficient numerical methods are indicated.
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4.1 Distortion risk measures
Let us assume that for all i ∈ S ∪PH, ρi satisfies (2.1) with distortion function gi. It is not
difficult to find that g∗S(·) = min
{
gi(·), i ∈ S∪PH
}
is a proper distortion function and let ρ∗S be
the corresponding distortion risk measure. Closed-form solutions to (3.7) are possible under this
setting and are stated in Proposition 4.1 (for details, see Section 4 of Boonen et al., 2016b), where
IA is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if A is true and 0, otherwise.
Proposition 4.1. Let X ∈ L∞+ (P) and ρi, i ∈ S ∪PH, be distortion risk measures as in (2.1). The
risk allocation XS solve
min
XS∈CS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xi) (4.1)
if and only if Xi = fi(X) with fi(0) = 0 and
f ′i(·) := I{gi(SX(·))<g∗S\i(SX(·))} + λSi (·)I{gi(SX(·))=g∗S\i(SX(·))}, (4.2)
holds almost surely for all i ∈ S, where λSi is a measurable and [0, 1]-valued function such that
∑
i∈S:gi
(
SX(·)
)
=g∗
S\i
(
SX(·)
)λSi (·) ≤ 1.
Proposition 4.1 provides explicit solutions for the optimal Pareto contracts that exhibits a layered
indemnity schedule. Such layered risk allocations are the most known non-proportional contracts
available on the insurance market, which gives even more evidence to support our model setting that
confirms the long-time insurance risk culture (see Arrow, 1963; Venter, 1991). Deductibles appear
in the optimal insurance literature with expected utilities, where objective is to maximize the utility
of the PH and the premium is a given expectation principle (Arrow, 1963). However, without the
presence of ex-post costs and when Pareto optimality is the criterion, deductible insurance is often
not optimal with expected utilities (Raviv, 1979). Note that if gPH(·) = gi(·) for all i ∈ S, then
Proposition 4.1 shows that any comonotonic risk allocation XS ∈ CS(X) solves (4.1). Also, if there
is one agent that is risk neutral gi(s) = s for all s ∈ [0, 1], and the other agents are averse towards
mean-preserving spreads (due to Yaari, 1987, this implies gi(s) ≥ s), then it is Pareto optimal when
the risk-neutral agent bears all the risk X.
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4.2 Exponential expected utilities
In this subsection, we briefly discuss another class of translation invariant preferences that is based
on exponential utility. This is a popular expected utility function that could be expressed as a
risk measure satisfying (P2). By definition, an exponential utility function is given by ui(z) =
−γi exp(−z/γi), where γi > 0 captures the risk tolerance and z ∈ R is interpreted as a gain. Since
we focuss on a generic random loss variable Y , we aim to minimise −E[ui(−Y )]. Then, we have
−u−1i (E[ui(−(Y + c))]) = −u−1i (E[ui(−Y )]) + c,
for any constant c ∈ R, where u−1i (·) in a strictly increasing function. Accordingly, we assume that
the risk measures for insurance agents i ∈ N ∪ PH are given by
ρi(Y ) = −u−1i (E[ui(−Y )]) = γk lnE
[
exp
(
Y/γk
)]
. (4.3)
This risk measure is also known as the entropic risk measure (see Barrieu and El Karoui, 2005).
One of the key properties of (4.3) is (P2), but it satisfies (P1) and (P6) as well (see Filipovic´ and
Svindland, 2008).
Theorem 3.9 of Barrieu and El Karoui (2005) provides a solution to (4.1) for the two insurance
agents case, but an extension to multiple agents is quite obvious and is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.2. Let X ∈ L∞+ (P) and ρi, i ∈ S ∪PH, be as in (4.3). The risk allocation XS solve
(4.1) if Xi =
γi∑
j∈S∪PH γj
X for any i ∈ S.
Proposition 4.2 shows that the optimal Pareto contracts exhibit a proportional indemnity sched-
ule. In general risk sharing problems where we allow for negative risk allocations, affine contracts are
Pareto optimal with exponential utilities (Borch, 1962). Moreover, zero-sum side-payments will not
affect Pareto optimality. In other words, if we find a Pareto optimal contract, we can construct a set
of Pareto optimal contracts by adding zero-sum side-payments. In our model, these side-payments
are captured by the premiums piS .
4.3 Examples with numerical solutions
Numerical solutions to (3.7) are always possible if the total risk X is discrete with a finite sample
space. This is the case if historical data are available, otherwise representative samples could be
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drawn from a parametric model that is either fitted on real data or is based on expert opinion
experience. Solving a discretised version of (3.7) requires a careful look for efficient numerical
methods. Two examples are further developed, which depend on the set of feasible solutions that
could be either AS or CS . Assume now that we have two insurers, i.e. N = {1, 2}, with risk
preferences given by:
ρ1(·) := E(·) + a
(
E
( · −E(·))2)1/2 and ρ2(·) := E(·) + b(E( · −E(·))c+)1/c
with a ≥ 0, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1, and 1 ≤ c ≤ ∞. If c = ∞, the above is read as E(·) + b(x· − E(·)). By
definition, x+ = max{x, 0} and x· := inf
{
x ∈ R : P(· ≤ x) = 1} represents the right-end point
of the sample space of a random variable. Formally, ρ1 is known as the standard deviation risk
measure, while ρ2 is a parametric class of non-comonotonic additive coherent risk measures that is
introduced by Fischer (2003). Note that these two risk measures satisfy (P1)–(P5). Finally, the PH
orders risk via a distortion risk measure with distortion function gPH .
As anticipated, the sample space of X is given by a finite set {xk, 1 ≤ k ≤ `} that without any
loss of generality is assumed to be increasingly ordered, i.e. x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ x`. We also assume
that every outcome has equal probability to occur. Each loss outcome, xk, is shared between the
three insurance players and we have that xk = yk + zk + tk, where yk and zk are the risk portions
for the first and second insurer, respectively, while tk represents the PH’s risk share. Therefore,
ρ1
(
X1
)
:= 1`1
Ty + a‖Qy‖√
`
, where ‖ · ‖ represents the Euclidean distance, 1 is a column vector of
ones, Q = I− 1`J with I and J being the identity matrix and matrix of ones, respectively. Further,
ρ2
(
X2
)
:=
1
`
1T z+ b
(
1
`
∑`
k=1
(
zk − 1
`
1T z
)c
+
)1/c
.
Let t(1) ≤ t(2) ≤ · · · ≤ t(`) be the order statistics sample. Thus, we have
ρPH
(
XPH
)
:=
∑`
k=1
(
gPH
(
(`− k + 1)/`)− gPH((`− k)/`))t(k) = ∑`
k=1
dkt(k), (4.4)
where dk := gPH
(
(`− k + 1)/`)− gPH((`− k)/`).
Assume first that CS is the set of feasible solutions. Hence, y, z and t are increasingly ordered
since x is ordered as well, which simplifies (4.4) and we have that ρPH
(
XPH
)
= dT t. The increasing
ordering requires that Ry ≤ 0, Rz ≤ 0 and Rt ≤ 0, where 0 is a column vector of zeroes and R is
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an `× ` matrix given by
R :=

0 0 · · · 0 0
1 −1 · · · 0 0
. . .
. . .
0 0 · · · 1 −1

.
Recall that by convention, an equality/inequality between two vectors is understood componentwise.
Now, (3.7) for this setting is equivalent to solving
min
(y,z,t)∈
R`×R`×R`
{
1
`
1Ty+
a√
`
‖Qy‖+ 1
`
1T z+ b
(
1
`
∑`
k=1
(
zk − 1
`
1T z
)c
+
)1/c
+ dT t
}
(4.5)
s.t. Ry ≤ 0,Rz ≤ 0,Rt ≤ 0,0 ≤ y,0 ≤ z,0 ≤ t,y+ z+ t = x.
For obvious computational reasons, the above is written as a Second Order Cone Program(SOCP).
Clearly, (4.5) is equivalent to solving
min
(y,z,t,u,v,w)∈
R`×R`×R`×R×R`×R
{
1
`
1Ty+
a√
`
u+
1
`
1T z+ b1
(∑`
k=1
vck
)1/c
+ dT t
}
s.t. ‖Qy‖ ≤ u, z− w1 ≤ v,0 ≤ v, 1
`
1T z = w, (4.6)
Ry ≤ 0,Rz ≤ 0,Rt ≤ 0,0 ≤ y,0 ≤ z,0 ≤ t,y+ z+ t = x
with b1 := b(1/`)
1/c. The above formulation is almost written in an SOCP form and only the
fourth term from the objective function requires more work. Recall that if c ∈ {1,∞}, then (4.6)
is directly SOCP-representable without any additional change, while the case in which c = 2 has a
straightforward SOCP reformulation as follows:
min
(y,z,t,u,v,w,ε)∈
R`×R`×R`×R×R`×R×R
{
1
`
1Ty+
a√
`
u+
1
`
1T z+ b1ε+ d
T t
}
s.t. ‖Qy‖ ≤ u, z− w1 ≤ v,0 ≤ v, 1
`
1T z = w, ‖v‖ ≤ ε, (4.7)
Ry ≤ 0,Rz ≤ 0,Rt ≤ 0,0 ≤ y,0 ≤ z,0 ≤ t,y+ z+ t = x.
We now briefly discuss the same issue whenever c = m/p with integers m > p, i.e. c is a rational
15
number. This assumption is not restrictive in any sense, since the set of rational numbers is
dense in R. The main idea appeared in various ways in the literature (see for example, Ben-Tal and
Nemirovski, 2001; Krokhmal and Soberanis, 2010) and is based on the so-called “tower of variables”
construction. The representation is similar to the one displayed in (4.7) where the epigraph type
constraint ‖v‖ ≤ ε is replaced by
(∑`
k=1
vck
)1/c
≤ ε, which is indeed SOCP-representable (for details,
see Morenko et al., 2013). For example, if c = 3, then the constraint in question could be rewritten
as follows:
1Tγ ≤ ε,0 ≤ γ,0 ≤ δ, v2k ≤ εδk, δ2k ≤ vkγk, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ `.
Thus, the SOCP reformulation of (4.6) when c = 3 is given by:
min
(y,z,t,u,v,w,ε,γ,δ)∈R`×R`×
R`×R×R`×R×R×R`×R`
{
1
`
1Ty+
a√
`
u+
1
`
1T z+ b1ε+ d
T t
}
s.t. ‖Qy‖ ≤ u, z− w1 ≤ v,0 ≤ v, 1
`
1T z = w,
1Tγ ≤ ε,0 ≤ γ,0 ≤ δ, (4.8)∥∥(2vk, ε− δk)∥∥ ≤ ε+ δk,∥∥(2δk, vk − γk)∥∥ ≤ vk + γk, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ `,
Ry ≤ 0,Rz ≤ 0,Rt ≤ 0,0 ≤ y,0 ≤ z,0 ≤ t,y+ z+ t = x.
Assume now thatAS is the set of feasible solutions. Since the vector t is not ordered anymore, the
problem becomes more cumbersome. Even though a solution is possible, it could be computationally
expensive (for details, see Asimit et al., 2017b). The optimisation problem does not require a
significant computational effort if gPH(x) = min
{
1, x/(1 − α)}, where 0 < α < 1, known in the
literature as the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) at level α (see Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000)
or Expected Shortfall at level α (see Acerbi and Tasche, 2002). From the computational point of
view, the CVaR formulation is more advantageous and is given by:
CVaRα(·) := inf
ξ∈R
{
ξ +
1
1− αE(· − ξ)+
}
,
where 0 < α < 1. Note that the coherence of CVaRis shown by Pflug (2000). Consequently, if the
PH orders risk via the CVaR, then optimising (3.7) under AS is equivalent to solving the following
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SOCP-type instance:
min
(y,z,t,u,v,w,ε,ξ,s)∈
R`×R`×R`×R×R`×R×R×R×R`
{
1
`
1Ty+
a√
`
u+
1
`
1T z+ b1ε+ ξ +
1
n(1− α)1
T s
}
s.t. ‖Qy‖ ≤ u, z− w1 ≤ v,0 ≤ v, 1
`
1T z = w, ‖v‖ ≤ ε,
t− ξ1 ≤ s,0 ≤ s,0 ≤ y,0 ≤ z,0 ≤ t,y+ z+ t = x,
where without loss of generality c = 2 is assumed in the above.
Example 4.3. Assume that a = b = 1, c ∈ {2, 3} and that the PH orders risk via CVaR80%.
Random samples of size 1, 000 are drawn for the total risk from a Log-Normal distribution with
parameters (µ, σ) = (10, 1) and a two-parameter Pareto distributed with survival function
(
1 +
·/λ)−γ such that the theoretical first two moments are matched with the Log-Normal distribution,
i.e. (γ, λ) = (4.78442, 926.018). As before, the total risk samples are assumed to be increasingly
ordered and CN is the set of feasible solutions (our numerical investigations showed that the optimal
contracts do not change if the optimisation is performed over AN ).
The Pareto optimal solutions are plotted in Figure 1 and we notice a layered optimal risk con-
tract. Figure 1 displays sensible results for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the Log-Normal distribution
exhibits a moderately heavy tail, while the Pareto distribution has a very heavy tail and therefore,
any insurer would absorb a higher amount of risk for the Pareto distribution. Secondly, the optimal
indemnity of the second insurer is larger when the setting c = 3 changes to c = 2.
5 Stable premiums
The previous results have shown how to efficiently allocate the risk amongst all insurance players,
but the premiums are yet to be set. For a Pareto optimal contract, the risk allocation XN is fixed,
but the premiums piN that the insurers charge are not fixed, though piN should satisfy the individual
rationality constraints from (2.2). Due to Theorem 3.1, we have that
∑
i∈N∪PH
ρi(Xi) ≤ ρPH(X),
with XN satisfying (3.7). If the inequality above is strict, there are typically multiple ways to
construct a premium vector that is individually rational for all insurance agents.
In this section, we notice that a vector of premiums could be perceived as an allocation of the
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x →
0 1000 2000 3000
0
500
1000
1500
Pareto, c = 3
x →
0 1000 2000 3000
0
500
1000
1500
Pareto, c = 2
x →
0 1000 2000 3000
0
500
1000
1500
Log-Normal, c = 3
x →
0 1000 2000 3000
0
500
1000
1500
Log-Normal, c = 2
Figure 1: Pareto optimal risk allocations
(
y∗, z∗, t∗
)
that solve (4.8) and are respectively displayed in
blue, red and yellow. The left and right panels show the Log-Normal and Pareto sample, respectively;
the top and lower panels correspond to the c = 3 and c = 2 case, respectively.
welfare gains in the market to all insurers, which is the key ingredient for our approach to justify
the premium charges. Specifically, we define a cooperative Transferable Utility (TU) game that
assigns the maximum welfare gains to every subset of insurers. We call a premium vector stable if
no subgroup of insurers has a joint incentive to stay in the market, while paying the other insurers
their maximum joint welfare gain. It is shown that stable vectors of premiums constitute anti-core
elements of a TU game.
As anticipated, we rely on cooperative game theory to determine prices. A TU game is given by
(N, vˆ), where vˆ : 2N → R is a mapping that assigns to every subgroup of the set N a utility level5;
by definition, an allocation is a vector aN ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N ai = vˆ(N). The core of TU games
is originally introduced by Gillies (1953) and is given by
core(N, vˆ) =
{
aN ∈ RN :
∑
i∈S
ai ≥ vˆ(S) for all S ⊂ N,
∑
i∈N
ai = vˆ(N)
}
. (5.1)
5Here, 2N is the collection of all subgroups of N .
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In other words, the core is the set of allocations such that no subgroup of agents has a joint
incentive to not cooperate with the other agents. The core is one of the most important concepts in
cooperative game theory (see, e.g., Scarf, 1967; Shapley and Shubik, 1969). It is generally accepted
that, if the core is a nonempty set, then the allocation on which the players agree should be a core
allocation. Formally, we have a ∈ core(N, vˆ) if, for each S ⊆ N , there exists no allocation aˆ ∈ RS
with
∑
i∈S aˆi = vˆ(S) such that each insurance player i ∈ S prefers the allocation aˆ above a: aˆi > ai
for all i ∈ S.
We further make use of the following two properties of a TU game (N, vˆ):
• concavity : vˆ(S ∪ {i})− vˆ(S) ≥ vˆ(T ∪ {i})− vˆ(T ), for all i ∈ N and S ⊂ T ⊆ N\{i};
• additivity : vˆ(S) = ∑i∈S vˆ({i}), for all S ⊆ N .
The remaining part of the section covers three settings. Firstly, a general setting is considered
where all risk preferences are monotonic and translation invariant. Secondly, we assume that the
risk preferences are given by distortion risk measures as defined in (2.1). Thirdly, we reflect on the
setting where the PH strictly benefits in the insurance contract.
5.1 Stable premiums with risk preferences satisfying (P1) and (P2)
Let us assume that ρi satisfies (P2) for all i∈N∪PH and ρPH satisfies (P1) as well. Once a risk
allocation is found via Pareto optimality as explained in Section 3 (for example, see (3.7)), another
main problem is now to determine the premium vector piN ∈ RN+ . We aim to use a TU game to
model the pricing for transferring the risk to various insurers. This leads to a collection of premium
vectors corresponding to the chosen risk allocation. At the moment, after identifying the optimal
Pareto contract, the premiums are known to belong to a set that depends on the optimal solution
XS and a refinement is now sought.
The welfare gain for a given S ⊆ N and XS ∈ CS(X) is as follows:
WG
(
S,XS
)
:= ρPH(X)−
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
)
.
Due to (P2), we can interpret the welfare gain as a monetary amount, i.e. WG
(
S,XS
)
is the
monetary amount that the insurers in S gain on aggregate by sharing the risk X via XS . Therefore,
it is natural to study the following TU game that assigns the maximum welfare gains for the insurers
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in S ⊆ N :
v(S) = max
XS∈AS(X)
WG
(
S,XS
)
= ρPH(X)− min
XS∈AS(X)
{ ∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
)}
, (5.2)
for all S ⊆ N . By construction, we have v(∅) = 0 and 0 ≤ v(S) ≥ v(T ) for all S ⊂ T ⊆ N .
This game assigns the maximum welfare gain that a subgroup may obtain by insuring the risk X
altogether. It is further assumed that the minimum in (5.2) exists for all S ⊆ N .
Recall that an allocation is a vector aN ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N ai = v(N). Now, the premium
charged by the ith insurer for insuring the risk Xi is pii = pˆii(Xi, ai), where
pˆii(Xi, ai) := ρi(Xi) + ai, i ∈ N, (5.3)
and XN ∈ AN (X) is an optimal Pareto risk allocation. For any
(
piN , XN
)
∈ PN such that
pii = pˆii(Xi, ai) for all i ∈ N , we get from (3.7) that
∑
i∈N
pˆii(Xi, ai) =
∑
i∈N
ρi(Xi) + v(N) = ρPH(X)− ρPH
(
XPH
)
.
Consequently, the PH is indifferent6. Moreover, if ai ≥ 0, then due to (P2) we have:
ρi(Xi − pˆii(Xi, ai)) = −ai ≤ 0,
so that insurer i is individually rational. Moreover, this implies that we are allowed to interpret
ai are a welfare gain for insurer i ∈ N . Theorem 3.1 implies that
(
piN , XN
)
∈ PN if XN satisfies
(3.7) and piN is as in (5.3) with aN ≥ 0. Hence, an allocation aN represents the welfare gains for
the insurers in a Pareto optimal contract, where the aggregate welfare gains are given by v(N).
We proceed with discussing the core of the game (N, v). First, we show that the core indeed
leads to stability, and make an explicit link with the insurance contract
(
piN , XN
)
.
Proposition 5.1. Assume that ρi is such that (P2) holds for all i ∈ N ∪PH, and let
(
piN , XN
) ∈
RN+ ×AN (X) be Pareto optimal. Then, it holds that aN ∈ core(N, v) for aN solving pii = pˆii(Xi, ai)
for all i ∈ N if and only if ∑i∈N (pii − ρi(Xi)) = v(N) and for all S ⊂ N there does not exist a
6This is relaxed in Section 5.3
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(
pˆiS , Xˆ
S) ∈ RS+ ×AS(X) such that
ρPH
(
XˆPH +
∑
i∈S
pˆii
)
≤ ρPH
(
XPH +
∑
i∈N
pii
)
, (5.4)
ρi(Xˆi − pˆii) ≤ ρi(Xi − pii), i ∈ S, (5.5)
with at least one inequality strict.
Proof. Let
(
piN , XN
) ∈ RN+ × AN (X) be Pareto optimal. Then, aN ∈ core(N, v) is equivalent to∑
i∈S ai ≥ v(S) or,
∑
i∈S(pii − ρi(Xi)) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N , and
∑
i∈N ai =
∑
i∈N (pii − ρi(Xi)) =
v(N). Then, it is sufficient to show that for all S ⊂ N , ∑i∈S(pii − ρi(Xi)) ≥ v(S) is equivalent
to the case that there does not exist a
(
pˆiS , Xˆ
S) ∈ RS+ × AS(X) such that (5.4)-(5.5) hold with
at least one inequality strict. Fix S ⊂ N . Since (pˆiS , XˆS) is Pareto optimal and thus feasible,
we have ρi(Xi − pii) ≤ 0. From this, and from the fact that the above preferences are linear in
the pii’s, we get from similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that there does not exist a(
pˆiS , Xˆ
S) ∈ RS+ ×AS(X) such that (5.4)-(5.5) hold with at least one inequality strict is equivalent
to the case that there does not exist Xˆ
S ∈ AS(X) such that
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xˆi) <
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xi) +
∑
i∈N\S
pii.
Or, equivalently, for all Xˆ
S ∈ AS(X) it holds
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xˆi) ≥
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xi) +
∑
i∈N\S
pii,
so that
min
Xˆ
S∈AS(X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi(Xˆi) ≥
∑
i∈N∪PH
ρi(Xi) +
∑
i∈N\S
(pii − ρi(Xi)).
Since
(
piN , XN
)
is Pareto optimal, we have by Theorem 3.1 that
∑
i∈N∪PH
ρi(Xi) = min
Xˆ
N∈AN (X)
∑
i∈N∪PH
ρi(Xˆi),
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and hence this is equivalent to
v(N)− v(S) ≥
∑
i∈N\S
(pii − ρi(Xi)).
Hence, since v(N) =
∑
i∈N (pii − ρi(Xi)), this is equivalent to
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
(pii − ρi(Xi)).
This concludes the proof.
The next proposition shows that premium allocations via the core of our game is possible only
under very restrictive conditions, i.e. additivity of the game (N, v). The additivity property is
strong and it does not need to hold for the reinsurance problem in (5.2).
Proposition 5.2. Assume that ρi is such that (P2) holds for all i ∈ N ∪ PH and ρPH satisfies
(P1). Then, core(N, v) 6= ∅ if and only if the TU game (N, v) is additive.
The proof is delegated to the appendix and makes use of the proof of Theorem 5.4, that is
stated later in this paper. Core elements yield insurance contracts in which all insurers benefit from
having more insurers in the market. Proposition 5.2 shows that this only happens in a specific case.
Moreover, if the core is non-empty, its unique element is given by ai = v({i}) for all i ∈ N , which
is a well-known property of additive games. Hence, the core is either empty or single-valued.
Because the core is generally empty, the inequality constraints of the core
∑
i∈S ai ≥ v(S) are
strong. We now proceed with studying the set of stable allocations, that include “milder” constraints
on
∑
i∈S ai. We define the set SA(N, v) as follows:
SA(N, v)=
{
aN ∈RN :
∑
i∈S
ai ≥ v(N)− v(N\S) for all S ⊂ N,
∑
i∈N
ai=v(N)
}
,
which has a very intuitive construction. The minimal allocation to a subgroup of insurers S ⊂ N
is determined as follows. The insurers in N\S get the maximum aggregate welfare gain, given by
v(N\S); if this welfare gain is completely allocated to the insurers in N\S, the insurers in S get
at least the remaining, i.e. v(N) − v(N\S) which is non-negative. Later, in the proof of Theorem
5.4, we will formally show that v(S) ≥ v(N) − v(N\S) for all S ⊆ N , so that the constraints in
SA(N, v) are indeed milder than for the core: core(N, v) ⊂ SA(N, v).
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We next show that the set SA(N, v) is the same as the anti-core of game (N, v), a statement
that is true under a very general setting.
Proposition 5.3. If v(S) is finite for all S ⊆ N , it holds that SA(N, v) = Acore(N, v), where
Acore(N, v) =
{
aN ∈ RN :
∑
i∈S
ai ≤ v(S) for all S ⊂ N,
∑
i∈N
ai = v(N)
}
. (5.6)
Proof. Let aN ∈ Acore(N, v). We get for every S ⊂ N that
∑
i∈S
ai =
∑
j∈N
aj −
∑
j∈N\S
aj ≥ v(N)− v(N\S).
Thus, aN ∈ SA(N, v). Further, we get that if aN ∈ SA(N, v), then
∑
i∈S
ai =
∑
j∈N
aj −
∑
j∈N\S
aj ≤ v(N)−
(
v(N)− v(S)) = v(S)
for all S ⊂ N . Hence, aN ∈ Acore(N, v). This concludes the proof.
The elements Acore(N, v) are the allocations of our interest. For a Pareto optimal contract,
the set Acore(N, v) helps us to construct a range of premiums that satisfy our stability conditions.
The next theorem shows that this set is non-empty, which concludes that the premium allocation
exercise is possible.
Theorem 5.4. Assume that ρi satisfies (P2) for all i ∈ N ∪ PH and ρPH satisfies (P1). If (5.2) is
well-defined for all S ⊆ N , then Acore(N, v) 6= ∅.
Proof. For S ⊆ N , let eS be the vector in RN such that eS(i) = 1 if i ∈ S, otherwise eS(i) = 0.
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) show that the core of a cooperative game (N, v) is non-empty
if and only if (N, v) is balanced; a game (N, v) is called balanced when
∑
S⊆N λSv(S) ≤ v(N) for
all λS ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
S⊆N λSeS = eN (the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem). Since, in general,
it holds that Acore(N, v) = −core(N,−v) for any TU game (Monderer et al., 1992), we have that
core(N,−v) 6= ∅ is an equivalent formulation to our claim. Thus, the game (N,−v) is balanced if
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S) ≥ v(N) for all λS ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
S⊆N
λSeS = eN .
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Now,
∑
S⊆N
λS ≥ 1 and
∑
S:i∈S⊆N
λS = 1 are clearly true and therefore
∑
S⊆N
λSv(S) = ρPH(X)
∑
S⊆N
λS −
∑
S⊆N
λS min
XS∈AS(X)
{∑
i∈S
ρi
(
Xi
)
+ ρPH
(
XPH
)}
≥ ρPH(X)
∑
S⊆N
λS − min
XN∈AN (X)
∑
S⊆N
λS
(∑
i∈S
ρi
(
Xi
)
+ ρPH
(
XPH
))
≥ ρPH(X)− min
XN∈AN (X)
{ ∑
S⊆N
λS
∑
i∈S
ρi
(
Xi
)
+ ρPH
(
XPH
)}
= ρPH(X)− min
XN∈AN (X)
{∑
i∈N
ρi
(
Xi
) ∑
S:i∈S⊆N
λS + ρPH
(
XPH
)}
= v(N).
Here, the second inequality follows from the fact that
(
ρPH(X)− ρPH
(
XPH
)) ∑
S⊆N
λS ≥ ρPH(X)− ρPH
(
XPH
)
for all XN ∈ AN (X),
which is due to the (P1) property of ρPH and the fact that
∑
S⊆N λS ≥ 1 and XPH ≤ X are true
for any XN ∈ AN (X). Therefore, core(N,−v) 6= ∅ due to the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem, which
concludes the proof.
5.2 Stable premiums with distorted risk preferences
We now assume more specific preferences than those considered in Section 5.1. This specific setting
is interesting in the sense that a closed-form expression of the set of stable allocations, SA(N, v), is
possible. That is, let us assume that ρi satisfies (2.1) with distortion function gi for all i∈ S ∪ PH
and the feasible set of risk allocations is CN (X). It is well-known that distortion risk measures
satisfy (P1) and (P2) (see Yaari, 1987). Then, it holds that:
WG
(
S,XS
)
=
∑
i∈S
(
ρPH
(
Xi
)− ρi(Xi)),
for all S ⊆ N and XS ∈ CS(X), since ρPH satisfies (P7) and the fact that the risk allocation is
comonotonic. It is readily verified from Proposition 4.1 that
∑
i∈S∪PH
ρi
(
Xi
)
= ρ∗S(X),
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whenever XS is as in (4.2) with ρ∗S being defined in Section 4.1. Then, we study the following TU
game (N, v):
v(S) = max
XS∈CS(X)
WG
(
S,XS
)
= ρPH(X)− ρ∗S(X), for all S ⊆ N, (5.7)
The next result shows that the TU game (N, v) has a special structure, namely is concave.
Consequently, the set SA(N, v) could be characterised by its marginal vectors (Shapley, 1971) and
for clarity, we state these results as Theorem 5.5. Recall that by definition, Π(N) is the set of all
permutations of N , while conv{·} represents the convex hull operator.
Theorem 5.5. Let ρi be distortion risk measures with distortion function gi as in (2.1) for all
i ∈ N ∪PH. Then, the TU game (N, v) from (5.7) is concave and SA(N, v)=conv{mσ :σ ∈ Π(N)},
where
mσσ(1) = v
({
σ(1)
})
and mσσ(i) = v
({
σ(1), . . . , σ(i)
})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i− 1)}), i = 2, . . . , n.
Proof. It holds for every 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 that
g∗S∪{i}(x)− g∗S(x) = min
{
gj(x) : j ∈ S ∪ {i} ∪ PH} −min{gj(x) : j ∈ S ∪ PH
}
= min
{
gi(x)−min{gj(x) : j ∈ S ∪ PH}, 0
}
≤ min{gi(x)−min{gj(x) : j ∈ T ∪ PH}, 0}
= min
{
gj(x) : j ∈ T ∪ {i} ∪ PH
}−min{gj(x) : j ∈ T ∪ PH}
= g∗T∪{i}(x)− g∗T (x),
for all i ∈ N and S ⊂ T ⊆ N\{i}. Then, we derive
ρ∗T∪{i}(X)− ρ∗T (X)− ρ∗S∪{i}(X) + ρ∗S(X)
=
∞∫
0
g∗T∪{i}
(
SX(z)
)
dz −
∞∫
0
g∗T
(
SX(z)
)
dz −
∞∫
0
g∗S∪{i}
(
SX(z)
)
dz +
∞∫
0
g∗S
(
SX(z)
)
dz
=
∞∫
0
(
g∗T∪{i}
(
SX(z)
)− g∗T (SX(z))− g∗S∪{i}(SX(z))+ g∗S(SX(z)))dz,
which is clearly non-negative. Therefore, v
(
S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≥ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) holds for all
i ∈ N and S ⊂ T ⊆ N\{i}. Hence, the game (N, v) is concave. For concave games, the anti-core
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is given by conv{mσ : σ ∈ Π(N)}, due to Theorems 3 and 5 of Shapley (1971) and the fact that
Acore(N, v) = −core(N,−v). The proof is now complete.
Note 5.6. In Theorem 5.5, we provide a closed-form expression for SA(N, v). This set is however
not necessarily single-valued. An open research question is still to characterise a single-valued
allocation to determine premiums. A well-known allocation rule of TU games is the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953). A PH directly approaches the insurers to insure its risk in a Pareto optimal way.
The Shapley value relies on a different approach and assumes that the PH first goes to randomly
assigned insurer. This insurer selects with the PH a risk allocation via Pareto optimality, and
the PH pays the aggregate premium such that it is indifferent. Then, the PH goes to the second
randomly assigned insurer and selects the risk allocation via Pareto optimality for the first two
insurers. The PH still pays the premium such that it is indifferent, the first insurer keeps its welfare
gain and the second insurer gets the increase in the welfare gain. Continuing this procedure leads
to an allocation; averaging this over all possible orderings of the insurers leads to the Shapley value.
In case of distortion risk measures, we show that the corresponding TU game (N, v) is concave
(see Theorem 5.5) and thus, the Shapley value constitutes an anti-core element (Shapley, 1971).
Generally, we leave in this paper the question to an appropriate solution open for further research.
5.3 Welfare gains for the PH
In this section, the approach we propose hinges on the assumption that the PH is indifferent, which
is now relaxed. Recall the maximum welfare gain v(S) = maxXS∈AS(X)WG
(
S,XS
)
from (5.2).
Suppose that in any transaction, there is a profit for the PH that is proportional to v(S). That is,
the PH has an ex-post risk given by ρPH(X) − δv(S) for δ ∈ [0, 1). Thus, in the market with all
insurers in N , the PH gets the welfare gain δv(N) and the remaining welfare gain, (1− δ)v(N), is
then allocated amongst the insurers in N .
Define vˆ(S) = (1 − δ)v(S), S ⊆ N . For a vector aN ∈ RN such that ∑i∈N ai = vˆ(N) and
pˆii(Xi, ai) as in (5.3), we get for any
(
piN , XN
)
∈ PN with pii = pˆii(Xi, ai) for all i ∈ N that
∑
i∈N
pˆii(Xi, ai) =
∑
i∈N
ρi(Xi) + vˆ(N) = ρPH(X)− ρPH
(
XPH
)− δv(N).
Clearly,
core(N, vˆ) = (1− δ) · core(N, v) := {(1− δ)a : a ∈ core(N, v)},
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SA(N, vˆ) = (1− δ) · SA(N, v) := {(1− δ)a : a ∈ SA(N, v)}.
Hence, Propositions 5.2 and 5.3, Theorem 5.4 and Theorem 5.5 remain valid for this setting where
(N, v) is replaced by (N, vˆ).
6 Optimal insurance and Pareto optimality
The current section aims to link the classical concept of Pareto optimality with the recent fast
growing literature on optimal insurance/reinsurance. These two concepts have been independently
investigated even though the ultimate aims are basically the same, i.e. finding efficient risk alloca-
tions. There is a vast literature on Pareto optimality and our focus has been on the risk sharing
problem between a PH and one or more insurers willing to absorb part of the PH’s risk. The Pareto
solutions provides a “fair” allocation amongst all parties involved in the risk allocation exercise.
In contrast, the optimal insurance/reinsurance problem is generically viewed as an optimisation
problem from one risk bearer point of view. These two strands of research have not crossed yet in
the literature and we try now to investigate whether the insurance/reinsurance problem leads to
contracts that are Pareto optimal.
In the insurance/reinsurance problem framework, it is assumed that the PH or one insurer seeks
to optimise its risk measure subject to rationality constraints, which in our case are given in (2.2).
The mathematical formulations of the optimal insurance contract set from the PH and a generic
insurer are
SPHS = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AS(X)
ρPH
(
XPH +
∑
i∈S
pii
)
s.t. condition (2.2) holds (6.1)
and
Si0S = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AS(X)
ρi0
(
Xi0 − pii0
)
s.t. condition (2.2) holds, (6.2)
respectively, where i0 ∈ S and S ⊆ N is a set of insurers. The next result shows that optimal
insurance contracts via individual risk efficiency are Pareto optimal as well, which shows that the
optimal insurance/reinsurance problem is well-posed. According to our knowledge, this link has not
been discussed in the literature, even though Pareto optimality and individual risk optimisation are
two related concepts.
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Proposition 6.1. Let i0 ∈ S with S ⊆ N and assume that ρi satisfies (P2) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH.
Then, SPHS ⊆ PS and Si0S ⊆ PS .
Proof. We show first that SPHS ⊆ PS and therefore, let
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) ∈ SPHS . Keeping in mind that
ρi satisfies (P2) and the fact that the objective function in (6.1) is continuous and increasing in each
pii for all i ∈ S, one may find that the insurers’ rationality inequality constraints become equality
constraints. Thus,
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) ∈ SS and in turn, we get that (pi∗S , X∗S) ∈ PS due to Theorem 3.1,
which justifies that SPHS ⊆ PS .
Next, we show Si0S ⊆ PS and therefore, let
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) ∈ Si0S . Recall that ρi satisfies (P2) and
since the objective function in (6.2) is continuous and decreasing in pii0 , then we may conclude that
pi∗i0 = ρPH(X)− ρPH
(
X∗PH
)− ∑
i∈S\{i0}
pi∗i .
Consequently,
(
pi∗S , X∗S
)
must solve
min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AS(X)
ρi0
(
Xi0
)
+ ρPH
(
XPH
)
+
∑
i∈S\{i0}
pii
s.t. ρi
(
Xi
)− pii ≤ 0, i ∈ S and ρPH(XPH)+∑
i∈S
pii ≤ ρPH(X).
Similar arguments to those given in the proof of SPHS ⊆ PS , one may show that
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) ∈ SS .
Thus,
(
pi∗S , X∗S
) ∈ PS due to Theorem 3.1, which completes the proof.
7 Model risk
Model risk has been ignored until this very moment and it has been assumed that all insurance
players have known the “true” distribution of the total risk and this probabilistic model is the same
amongst all players, i.e homogeneous beliefs are only considered. This convenient assumption may
lead to decisions that are very sensitive to small changes in the chosen model, which affects the
optimal decision. This problem could be tackled by using statistical tools, but the ultimate goal
is to produce an optimal robust decision, which is the main objective of a robust optimisation. In
addition, Asimit et al. (2017a) has shown the advantage of robust optimisation over the statistical
methods and for these reasons, this section is focused on standard robust optimisation to deal with
model risk. This source of risk could be viewed such that the “true” probability measure is not
unknown, but it belongs to a set of possible available probability models that are based on statistical
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evidence, expert opinion or “good practice” in the sector.
The mathematical formulation of the model risk is such that the “true” probability measure for
a given insurer or the PH is one amongst various available choices,
{
Pj , j ∈Mi
}
with i ∈ N ∪ PH
Mi being an index set. clearly, these probability measures are defined on the same sample space
As a result, X,Xi ∈ Lp+(Pi) for all i ∈ N ∪PH and j ∈Mi. We define ρi(·;Pj) as the risk measure
given the underlying probability measure Pj for i ∈ N ∪PH and j ∈Mi. The rationality constraint
for each insurer and PH is now given by
ρi
(
Xi−pii;Pj1
) ≤ 0 and ρPH (XPH +∑
k∈S
pik;Pj2
)
≤ρPH
(
X;Pj2
)
(7.1)
for all i ∈ S, j1 ∈ Mi and j2 ∈ MPH . Therefore, a contract
(
piS , XS
)
is feasible and we write(
piS , XS
) ∈ RS+ ×AMS (X), where
AMS (X) =
{
XS :
∑
i∈S∪PH
Xi = X, Xi ∈ Lp+(Pj) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH, j ∈Mi
}
,
if (7.1) holds. Further, the contract
(
piS , XS
) ∈ RS+ × AMS (X) is called Pareto robust optimal if
there is no other feasible contract
(
p˜iS , X˜
S) ∈ RS+ ×AMS (X) such that
ρi
(
X˜i − p˜ii;Pj1
) ≤ ρi(Xi − pii;Pj1) and ρPH
(
X˜PH +
∑
k∈S
p˜ik;Pj2
)
≤ ρPH
(
XPH +
∑
k∈S
pik;Pj2
)
for all i ∈ S, j1 ∈ Mi and j2 ∈ MPH , with at least one strict inequality. Let us denote PMS as the
set of all Pareto robust optimal contracts.
The individual robust optimisation problems involve the well-known (in robust optimisation)
worst-case scenario approach. The mathematical formulations for the optimal insurance contract
set from the PH and a generic insurer under model risk are
SPH,MS = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AS(X)
max
j∈MPH
{
ρPH
(
XPH ;Pj
)
+
∑
k∈S
pik
}
s.t. (7.1) holds
and
Si0,MS = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AS(X)
max
j∈Mi0
ρi0
(
Xi0 − pii0 ;Pj
)
s.t. (7.1) holds,
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respectively, where i0 ∈ S and S ⊆ N is a set of insurers.
Extensions of Theorem 3.1 in the presence of model risk are now given in Proposition 7.1. Its
proof is omitted, since is similar to the arguments given in the “if” part proof of Theorem 3.1 and
the proof of Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 7.1. Let S ⊆ N and assume that ρi and ρPH satisfy (P2) for all i ∈ S. Then,
i) S+MS ⊆ PMS if |Mj | = |MPH | for all j ∈ S, where | · | represents the cardinality of a set,
ii) SPH,MS ⊆ SMS and Si0,MS ⊆ SM
′
S ,
where
S+MS = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AMS (X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
∑
j∈Mi
ρi
(
Xi;Pj
)
s.t. ρi
(
Xi − pii;Pj1
) ≤ 0, ρPH (XPH +∑
k∈S
pik;Pj2
)
≤ ρPH
(
X;Pj2
)
for all i ∈ S, j1 ∈Mi and j2 ∈MPH ,
SMS = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AMS (X)
∑
i∈S∪PH
max
j∈Mi
ρi
(
Xi;Pj
)
s.t. ρi
(
Xi − pii;Pj1
) ≤ 0, ρPH(XPH +∑
k∈S
pik;Pj2
) ≤ ρPH(X;Pj2)
for all i ∈ S, j1 ∈Mi and j2 ∈MPH ,
and
SM′S = arg min(
piS ,XS
)
∈RS+×AMS (X)
∑
i∈S
max
j∈Mi
ρi
(
Xi;Pj
)
+ max
j∈MPH
{
ρPH
(
XPH ;Pj
)− ρPH(X;Pj)}
s.t. ρi
(
Xi − pii;Pj1
) ≤ 0, ρPH(XPH +∑
k∈S
pik;Pj2
) ≤ ρPH(X;Pj2)
for all i ∈ S, j1 ∈Mi and j2 ∈MPH .
Proposition 7.1 tells us how to find some Pareto robust optimal contracts, namely by finding
S+MS . Finding all Pareto robust optimal contracts is a much more difficult problem and involves
standard multi-objective optimisation methods such as the weighted sum scalarisation (for example,
see Miettinen, 1999; Ehrgott, 2005) when all risk measures are convex. It is well-known that
the worst-case robust optimisation problems may not lead to Pareto robust contracts if there are
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multiple solutions. Interesting discussions that link the multi-objective optimisation with the worst-
case robust optimisation are provided in Ehrgott et al. (2014) and Ide and Scho¨bel (2016), but SMS
represents the most natural worst-case robust optimisation formulation when the optimisation is
viewed from a joint point of view. It is still challenging to find elements of SMS
⋂PMS and SMS ⋂PM′S ,
but specific applications require different practical solutions (for example, see Iancu and Trichakis,
2014; Asimit et al., 2017a). The last main result of the section shows a situation in which finding
solutions for SMS
⋂PMS and SMS ⋂PM′S is possible. We next provide an extension of Theorem 5.1
of Asimit et al. (2017a), which allows us to explain our point, but the proof is left to the reader
since it is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1 of Asimit et al. (2017a).
Proposition 7.2. Let (x∗1, . . . ,x∗n) be any optimal solution of the following problem
min
(x1,...,xn)∈
R`×···×R`
n∑
i=1
max
j∈Mi
{
cTijxi + dij
}
s.t. Aixi ≤ bi, 1≤ i≤n, x1+· · ·+xn = x, (7.2)
with known Ai, bi, cij and x matrices and column vectors of appropriate dimensions and known
scalars dij . Moreover, consider the following optimisation problem:
min
(y1,...,yn)∈
R`×···×R`
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Mi
cTijyi s.t. Ai(x
∗
i +yi) ≤ bi, cTijyi ≤ 0, 1≤ i≤n, j ∈Mi, y1+· · ·+yn = 0. (7.3)
i) If the optimal objective value in (7.3) is zero, then (x∗1, . . . ,x∗n) is Pareto robust efficient in the
sense that there is no other (x˜1, . . . , x˜n) ∈ R`×· · ·×R` feasible in (7.2) such that cTijx∗i ≥ cTijx˜i
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, j ∈Mi and at least one inequality is strict.
ii) If the optimal objective value in (7.3) is negative, then (x∗1 +y∗1, . . . ,x∗n +y∗n) solves (7.2) and
is Pareto robust efficient, where (y∗1, . . . ,y∗n) is an optimal solution of (7.3).
Note 7.3. One may apply Proposition 7.2 for finding solutions for SMS
⋂PMS and SMS ⋂PM′S in
a particular setting where the state space is finite, i.e. Ω = {x1, . . . , x`}. If ρ is a distortion risk
measure as defined in (2.1), then ρ(X;P) = dTx provided that x is increasingly ordered, where
dk = g
(
1−
k−1∑
s=1
ps
)
− g
(
1−
k∑
s=1
ps
)
and P(X = xk) = pk for all 1 ≤ k ≤ `
for further details, see Dhaene et al. (2012). Clearly, if ρi satisfy (2.1) for all i ∈ S ∪ PH and the
admissible set of XS is CS(X), then the optimisation problems with the set of optimal solutions
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given by SMS
⋂PMS and SM′S ⋂PMS have only linear terms and become a special case of problem
(7.2) in Proposition 7.2.
A final conclusion could be drawn after all of these findings. The individual robust solutions
could be written in various ways, but SM is the most natural formulation. Proposition 7.2 shows
that linear formulations have the advantage of finding optimal Pareto contracts that solve SM or
SM′ , which is the ultimate goal of our analysis. Finding optimal Pareto contracts for non-linear
instances is an open problem that remains to investigate in the future.
8 Conclusions
This paper provides micro-economic theory for optimal insurance contract design with translation
invariant risk measures. Whereas traditional actuarial papers on optimal insurance focus on op-
timising future utility of one specific party, we study Pareto optimality and the anti-core of an
appropriate game. The set of Pareto optimal contracts is characterised, and we find that Pareto
optimality leads to a structure on the indemnity functions, and the premiums need guarantee indi-
vidual rationality. This allows us to disentangle the indemnity functions and premiums, where the
set of premiums that can be chosen with Pareto optimality is not necessarily single-valued. Further,
we propose to select premiums in the anti-core of an appropriate cooperative game.
The optimal reinsurance contract design has been investigated in the last decade, but indepen-
dent of the vast classical Pareto optimality literature; we show that these two concepts are very
much related and in fact, optimal reinsurance contracts are in fact Pareto optimal. This is an inter-
esting result that shows why the optimal reinsurance contract design provides valuable information
even though focuses on a small subset of the set of Pareto optimal contracts. The final part of the
paper discusses the model risk issue and we manage to explain how a robust and optimal Pareto
optimal contract could be found.
Existing literature on Pareto optimality of insurance contracts with expected utility preferences
focuses on the effect of costs. When there are ex-post costs, insurance policies with an upper limit
are not part of the solution. When these costs are variable, deductibles appear in Pareto optimal
contracts (see Raviv, 1979; Blazenko, 1985; Spaeter and Roger, 1997). Aase (2017) extends this
result of Pareto optimal deductibles to the case of ex-post quasi-costs: the costs include a fixed cost
each time a claim is made. In this paper, we neglect costs, and find that Pareto optimal deductibles
may exist when distortion risk measures are used. We believe that a study of costs on Pareto
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optimal contracts with risk measures would be interesting to investigate in the coming future.
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A Proof of Proposition 5.2
It is well-known that additive games have a non-empty core and therefore, we only need to show
the “only if” part of the proof. Now, suppose core(N, v) 6= ∅. The Bondareva-Shapley Theorem
(see the proof of Theorem 5.4) states that core(N, v) is non-empty if and only if the game (N, v) is
balanced. Take the balanced collection λSˆ = 1 if |Sˆ| = 1 and λSˆ = 0 otherwise. Let S ⊆ N and
since (N, v) is balanced, then it holds that
∑
i∈S v({i}) ≤ v(S). Moreover, since (N,−v) is balanced
as well (see Theorem 5.4), we have
∑
i∈S v({i}) ≥ v(S) and hence,
∑
i∈S v({i}) = v(S). The latter
holds for all S ⊆ N and consequently, the TU game (N, v) is additive, which concludes our proof.
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